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Abstract
Goldin and Katzs The Race between Education and Technology is a monumental achievement that
supplies a unied framework for interpreting how the demand and supply of human capital have shaped
the distribution of earnings in the U.S. labor market over the 20th century. This essay reviews the
theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of this work and documents the success of Goldin and Katzs
framework in accounting for numerous broad labor market trends. The essay also considers areas where
the framework falls short in explaining several key labor market puzzles of recent decades and argues
that these shortcomings can potentially be overcome by relaxing the implicit equivalence drawn between
workersskills and their job tasks in the conceptual framework on which Goldin and Katz build. The
essay argues that allowing for a richer set of interactions between skills and technologies in accomplishing
job tasks both augments and renes the predictions of Goldin and Katzs approach and suggests an even
more important role for human capital in economic growth than indicated by their analysis.
Keywords: earnings, education, economic growth, inequality, human capital, inequality, skills, skill-
biased technological change, tasks, technology.
JEL Classication: J30, J31, O14, O31, O33.
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1 Introduction
Goldin and Katzs magnum opus, The Race between Education and Technology, rivals Beckers
Human Capital in ambition and potential inuence over the economics profession and beyond.
Becker formulated a new and empirically fruitful framework for economists and policymakers to
think about skills how they are used, how markets price them and how and why workers and
rms invest in them. The way most economists currently think about the supply and demand
for human capital is still largely shaped by Beckers insights. Goldin and Katzs book promises
to be equally transformative. It is erudite, well researched, well written and interesting. Most
importantly, it is a coherent and compelling account of how human capital has been the dening
factor for the American century mostly for America, but also for much of the industrialized
world.
What is a reviewer to do? It is tempting to simply summarize the books arguments and
marvel at how well they are constructed. But not only would this make a tedious review, it
would constitute a missed opportunity. Based on the hope that transformative contributions
catalyze the literature in part by encouraging others to venture beyond their remit, we will take
an alternative path. We will attempt instead to do justice to Goldin and Katzs accomplishment
by pushing their argument further to frame some of the important questions that lie ahead on
the agenda that they have established.
The Race between Education and Technology is a multilayered book with dozens of interesting
and useful ideas and hypotheses, all supported with historical evidence and data. But its core,
as we see it, is made up of the following four arguments:
1. U.S. leadership, which Goldin and Katz describe as U.S. exceptionalism,in educational
investments has visible economic, political and social roots that are related to specic
characteristics of American society at the turn of the 20th century.
2. Human capital is a central determinant of economic growth, both in general and in the
specic case of economic growth in the United States during the 20th century.
3. Investments in human capital can play a major equalizing role. Under the Tinbergian
assumption that technology is skill-biased, technological progress will necessarily widen
inequality among skill groups unless it is countered by increases in the supply of human
capital. The steady accumulation of human capital has thus been the main equalizer in
the U.S. labor market. The rise in inequality over the last three or so decades, in turn,
can be understood as the consequence of a slowing rate of accumulation of human capital,
which has not kept pace with skill-biased technological change.
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4. The United States has, to a signicant degree, lost its educational leadership because its
educational institutions have become decadent. This problem can be redressed through
reform and re-investment.
We largely agree with all four of Goldin and Katzs arguments, in part because they are
exposited so clearly and supported with compelling historical and econometric evidence. At the
same time, however, acknowledging the multifaceted nature of human capital and understanding
how it is allocated to a changing set of tasks broadens in fact strengthens the argument.
Underlying all four of Goldin and Katzs main arguments is a theory of what human cap-
ital does,which is where the book connects closely with Beckers contribution on the theory
of human capital. Human capital, according to this view, augments e¤ective units of labor,
thereby making workers more productive. Although human capital is potentially applicable to
all jobs, tasks, occupations and industries, the demand for human capital is not uniform across
all domains that is, some activities are more skill-intensive than others. Consequently, increas-
ing the supply of human capital to the economy will tend to increase the relative output of these
skill-intensive activities and hence reduce the skill premium that educated workers command.
These observations in turn undergird what we refer to as the canonical model,which is the
conceptual centerpiece of the Goldin and Katz analysis.1 The canonical model builds on seminal
contributions by Gary Becker, Jan Tinbergen whose metaphorical race between education and
technology inspires the books title Finis Welch, and, of course, the corpus of scholarship
created by Goldin and Katz over more than two decades. In this model, technological progress
raises the demand for skill, and human capital investments slake that demand. When demand
moves outward faster than does the supply of human capital, inequality rises, and vice versa
when supply outpaces demand.
The canonical model has withstood the test of time and has proven to be of ongoing relevance
in analyzing and interpreting a rich and diverse set of facts. Nevertheless, by confronting this
canonical model with the major developments in the U.S. economy and labor market over the
course of a century, Goldin and Katzs analysis also underscores some of its limitations. What
the canonical model does not deny, though largely leaves out, is that human capital is multidi-
mensional. Workers produce work by performing job tasks, and di¤erent tasks require di¤erent
types of skills. Workers with di¤erent types of skills have varying comparative advantages for
these tasks. Changes in technology and in the supply of skills a¤ect what types of tasks are in
demand and how the available set of skills are assigned to these di¤erent tasks. This, we will
argue, creates a rather di¤erent and more nuanced picture of what human capital does.By
1Atkinson (2008) refers to this as the Textbook Model.
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implication, it also leads to a somewhat di¤erent perspective on many of the developments in
the United Statesand other advanced nationslabor markets.
In Section 2, we start with a discussion of the rst and second of their arguments and
argue that Goldin and Katzs analysis can be extended further by placing more emphasis on
the political economy of education in the United States and going beyond the standard growth
accounting framework for measuring the contribution of human capital to U.S. economic growth.
The bulk of our review will focus on the third argument, which centers around Goldin and Katzs
synthesis of the standard model. This is presented in Section 3. In this section, we also present
a review of several recent trends in the U.S. labor market which are challenging to this canonical
model. In Section 4, we develop the argument that a theoretical framework based on the
allocation of di¤erent types of human capital to distinct tasks may be a useful starting point for
analyzing the patterns that are challenging for the canonical model.2 To do this, we provide a
sketch of a baseline framework that incorporates these aspects, and we explain how this rened
framework may contribute to a more holistic explanation for some of the empirical patterns
motivating Goldin and Katzs synthesis and also strengthen their emphasis on the central role
played by human capital in 20th-century U.S. growth. We conclude in Section 5 with a discussion
of Goldin and Katzs fourth argument centering around the causes of and potential remedies
to the decline in the U.S. education system, and how the task-based approach potentially
complements their conclusions.
2 The Human Capital Century
Goldin and Katz forcefully argue that the 20th century was the human capital century for
the United States and the world, and the United States exceptional leadership in investing
in the skills of its workforce was a major driver of economic growth. This is an important
and compelling argument, though more remains to be said about why the United States was
exceptional and how its investments in human capital contributed to growth.
2.1 American Exceptionalism
Goldin and Katz summarize American exceptionalism in schooling as follows:
By the early twentieth century America educated its youth to a far greater
extent than did most, if not every, European country. Secondary schools in America
2Notably, Goldin and Katz explore closely related ideas in other recent publications, for example, Autor, Katz
and Kearney (2006, 2008) and Goldin and Katz (2007), but given their intended broad audience, focus on the
canonical model in the book.
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were free and generally accessible, whereas they were costly and often inaccessible
in most of Europe. Even by the 1930s America was virtually alone in providing
universally free and accessible secondary schools.(page 12)
The United States expanded its lead in education in the twentieth century by
instituting mass secondary schooling and then establishing a exible and multifaceted
higher education system.(page 18)
Their Table 1.1 shows the striking contrast between the United Kingdom and the United
States. In the late 1930s, only about 38 percent of 14-year-olds and 4 percent of 17-year-olds were
enrolled in school in Britain, while almost 68 percent of 14 to 17-year-olds were enrolled in school
in the United States. Goldin and Katz are absolutely correct to emphasize how consequential
this mass schooling system was for U.S. society, and Chapter 4 of the book usefully pinpoints
the several pillars that have supported this system: public funding, public provision, local
decentralization, separation of church and state, gender neutrality, and the open and forgiving
nature of the system. Their account also highlights the proximate factors that allowed mass
schooling to thrive, including the presence of scally independent, mostly small districts, local
property taxation, and local control over schools.
Nevertheless, the book does not provide a fully compelling answer to the question of why
America became exceptional. In Chapter 1, Goldin and Katz suggest that a pivotal factor may
have been the greater importance of general training based on formal schooling in America at
a time when much of Europe relied on specic training on the job for investing in the skills
of much of its non-elite population. While this characterization is no doubt accurate, it is not
entirely clear why this distinction should by itself lead to substantially greater levels of public
investment in the U.S. as well as greater openness and forgivingness of the educational system,
particularly for non-elite students. The other factors Goldin and Katz emphasize, such as locally
decentralized and independent school districts, the separation of church and state, and gender
neutrality, also appear important in the development of the American education system. But
why these choices have been made in the United States, and not elsewhere, is less clear.
A seemingly central factor that receives less attention than it deserves is political economy
or, more crudely, politics. The unique educational institutions that are indigenous to the United
States may have resulted not from optimal or even intentional design, but from a conict in which
the masses the non-elite elements of society were particularly successful in resisting elite
designs. For example, setting up a society based on principles of equality, governed by the people
through general assemblies and investing in their education through a mass schooling system,
could not have been further from the plans of the leading members of the Virginia Company
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when they set about colonizing Jamestown. It was only when their strategy of capturing and
enslaving locals and their next best alternative, putting the lower strata of the settlers brought
in as indentured servants to work in gangs for the benet of the elites and the Company, failed
and was met with erce resistance, that the beginning of U.S. institutions as we recognize them
today started taking shape. The attempts to coerce the settlers were replaced by the headright
system,granting them land in 1618 and a General Assembly for the settlers to govern themselves
in 1619. Similar events played out in Maryland, the Carolinas and elsewhere, with remarkably
similar outcomes. The United States was rst ahead of Europe not in its schooling system or
other aspects of economic institutions, but in its politics. In the early 20th century, the United
States was again ahead of Europe in its responsiveness to the political wishes of the majority
of the population. The Populist and Progressive movements contributed to the emergence of
an era in which the government took actions against the monopoly of the Robber Barons and
attempted to limit the extent to which the playing eld had become highly uneven.3
Though more research is needed to determine the role of political factors in shaping the
American schooling system, it seems plausible that the General Assemblies of the early colonial
period were the mainstay of the open American schools, and the active involvement of the masses
was a major contributor to the spread of mass schooling in the 20th century. Whether this is so
is not merely of antiquarian interest. The answer bears on the critical contemporary question of
whether the current barriers to upgrading schooling quality in the United States and elsewhere
today are primarily scal and technological i.e., realigning teacher incentives or selecting good
principals or whether they are fundamentally political in nature, an issue we return to below.
2.2 The Contribution of Human Capital to Growth
Goldin and Katz begin the book by stating:
That the twentieth century was both the American Century and the Human
Capital Century is no accident. Economic growth in the modern period requires
educated workers, managers, entrepreneurs, and citizens. Modern technologies must
be invented, innovated, put in place, and maintained. They must have capable
workers at the helm.(pages 1-2, italics in the original).
They are right both in emphasizing the importance of human capital for U.S. growth and
identifying some of the mechanisms through which this has likely operated.
3The discussion in this and the previous paragraph draws on Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and Galenson
(1996). These ideas are consistent with Goldin and Katzs discussion of the grassroots nature of the early
American education system.
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They also provide a careful accounting exercise to measure the extent to which increases
in the human capital of the workforce have contributed to U.S. growth. This is based on the
common approach in the growth literature, which posits an aggregate production function
Y = F (K;X;A) ; (1)
summarizing the relationship between aggregate output, Y , the stock of physical capital, K,
the stock of human capital, X (e.g., measured as e¢ ciency units of labor), and technology,
A, measured as the residual from the accounting exercise. Here Goldin and Katz follow the
economic growth literature in assuming that all forms of human capital enter the aggregate
production function simply through the aggregate X. Moreover, the standard assumption in
growth accounting exercises is that the function F exhibits constant returns to scale in K and
X. Under these and additional assumptions that all factor markets are competitive and there
are no technological (or human capital) externalities and production, and denoting the growth
rate of variable Z by gZ and the rental rate of capital by R, the growth rate of aggregate output
can be expressed as (e.g., Acemoglu, 2009, Chapter 3):
gY = gA +
RK
Y
gK +
wXX
Y
gX ; (2)
where X is computed as the total stock (e¢ ciency units) of human capital. Finally, gA is
interpreted as the contribution of technological change to economic growth, typically computed
as the residual in such growth accounting exercises using data on the other variables in (2).
Goldin and Katz assume that F takes a Cobb-Douglas form with the share of labor/human
capital, X, equal to 0.7, which implies that wXX=Y = 0:7 and RK=Y = 0:3. They are more
careful than many in the way they measure the stock of human capital in the economy, which
they accomplish by aggregating micro data on hours across groups of workers with di¤erent
education and demographic characteristics using observed wages as weights. This is the correct
approach based on their assumptions, which are the standard assumptions in the literature. We
discuss and critique the economic foundations of these assumptions in 4.3 below.
Nevertheless, Goldin and Katzs accounting exercise does not provide answers that are fully
consistent with their emphasis on the role of human capital. Their Table 1.3 shows that on
average less than 15 percent of U.S. growth is accounted for by the increase in the human capital
of American workers according to this methodology, i.e., by the term (wXX=Y ) gX . This does
not look like the sort of number that would deserve the title Human Capital Century. So why
the discrepancy?
Our view is that Goldin and Katz are right in emphasizing the centrality of human capital
to economic growth, but the vehicle they use for measuring the contribution of human capital
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to this process does not do justice to the multifaceted role that human capital plays. The rst
problem, as Goldin and Katz make clear in the above-quoted passage and discuss further in
the book, is that human capital is a major contributor to creation and adoption of frontier
technologies. U.S. technological leadership in the world would not have been possible without
the participation of a broad segment of the population in high-tech industries. U.S. workers
were able to play this role because they had access to high-quality education by the standards
of the time. But the growth accounting framework implicitly ignores the role of human capital
investments in fostering technological change. To be clear, this is a limitation of the growth
accounting model, not its end users. Goldin and Katz are acutely aware of this limitation
and emphasize throughout the book the indirect contribution that education makes to growth,
writing on page 40 that, Although it is di¢ cult to quantify these indirect contributions of
education to economic growth, they are bound to have been quite large.4
The second potential problem, which is intimately linked to the set of issues we highlight in
our discussion in Section 4, relates to the impact of human capital on the productive use of new
technologies. The root of this problem is again that the standard growth accounting framework
does not allow for a rich interaction between the implementation and spread of new technologies
and human capital. It is plausible that certain types of human capital are particularly useful
when combined with the most advanced technologies. Formally, the degree of complementarity
or substitutability between technologies and human capital may di¤er among technologies and
over time. The canonical model that Goldin and Katz use for interpreting the relationship
between human capital and the structure of wages, which we discuss in the next two sections,
allows for this possibility but only in a limited form as we will argue in Section 4. Going
beyond the canonical model to formally study these richer interactions may signicantly enrich
our understanding of the contribution of human capital to growth in particular by explicitly
linking the economic value of human capital to the set of tasks demanded in the economy.
But before we attempt to amend the canonical model, we rst highlight its power and utility.
4Though the relationship between human capital and technological progress the creation and adoption of
new technologies is beyond the scope of our review, it is useful to note that it operates at least through three
channels. First, the human capital, and access to education, of the most talented individuals in society is probably
the most important factor underpinning technological progress. Second, the human capital of the workforce may
inuence the pace of technological change both because of human capital externalities and because it changes
the incentives for overall technological progress (as many technologies may not be protable without the requisite
skills from the workforce). Third and relatedly, the composition of human capital of the workforce potentially
a¤ects the direction of technological progress (e.g., Acemoglu, 1998), and we will return to this issue briey in
the last section.
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3 The Canonical Model and the Data
Pronounced changes in the distribution of earnings and the returns to college over the last several
decades have motivated a large literature exploring the relationship between technical change
and wages. The starting point of this literature is the observation that the return to skills, as
measured by the wages of college graduates relative to high school graduates, for example, has
increased over multiple decades despite the large secular increase in the relative supply of college
educated workers. This suggests that concurrent with the increase in the supply of skills, there
has been an increase in the (relative) demand for skills. Following Tinbergens pioneering (1974)
work, the relative demand for skills is then linked to technology, and in particular to the skill bias
of technical change. These ideas are elegantly and powerfully operationalized in the canonical
model, which we present next. We then outline how the canonical model can be used to explain
the evolution of skill in college premia and earnings inequality, and then we summarize some of
the empirical trends that are challenging to interpret through the lens of this model.
3.1 The Canonical Model
The canonical model includes two skill groups performing two distinct and imperfectly sub-
stitutable occupations (or producing two imperfectly substitutable goods).5 Technology is as-
sumed to take a factor-augmenting form, and thus complements either high or low skill workers.
Changes in this factor-augmenting technology capture skill-biased technical change. In this ap-
proach, the college/high-school log wage ratio serves as a summary index of the premium that
high skill workers command relative to low skill workers, and this premium is determined by the
relative supply and demand for skills. The relative demand for skills increases over time because
changes in technology are assumed to be skill biased,in the sense that they demand relatively
more, or are more complementary to, high skill workers. The steady increase in the relative
supply over the last century and a half, due both to greater public investments in schooling and
because of greater willingness of families and individuals to obtain schooling, leads to Tinber-
gens famous race between education and technology (and the eponymous title of Goldin and
Katzs book).
Suppose that the total supply of low skill labor is L and the total supply of high skill labor is
H. In particular, let us assume that workers are in one of two mutually inclusive groups, the set of
low skill workers, L, and the set of high skill workers, H, and that there is heterogeneity in skills
or e¢ ciency units of labor. Then total supplies are given by L =
R
i2L lidi and H =
R
i2H hidi,
5Early applications of this model to U.S. labor market include Welch (1974), Katz and Murphy (1992) and
Goldin and Margot (1992). In many cases, this model is extended to more than two skill groups (see., e.g., Katz
and Murphy, 1992, Card and Lemieux, 2001, and Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle, 2004).
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where li (hi) denotes the e¢ ciency units of low (high) skill labor that worker i possesses.6
The production function for the aggregate economy takes the following constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) form
Y =
h
(ALL)
 1
 + (1  ) (AHH)
 1

i 
 1
; (3)
where  2 [0;1) is the elasticity of substitution between high skill and low skill labor, AL and AH
are factor-augmenting technology terms, and  is a distribution parameter that determines the
relative importance of low skill labor in the production function. The elasticity of substitution
between high and low skill workers plays a pivotal role in interpreting the e¤ects of di¤erent
types of technological changes in the canonical model.7 In this framework, technologies are
factor-augmenting, meaning that technological change serves to either increase the productivity
of high or low skill workers (or both), so there are no explicitly skill-replacing technologies.8
Assuming that factor markets are competitive, unskilled and skilled wages, wL and wH ,
are given by their marginal products, and can be obtained by di¤erentiating (3). Combining
these wages, we can also obtain the skill premium the high skill wage divided by the low skill
wage as
! =
wH
wL
=
1  


AH
AL
 1


H
L
  1

; (4)
which can be rewritten conveniently by taking logs,
ln! = constant+
   1

ln

AH
AL

  1

ln

H
L

: (5)
This equation shows the two key forces in the Tinbergen model: changes in the skill-bias of
technology, reected in the evolution of AH=AL; and changes in the relative supply of skills,
reected in the evolution of H=L.
The (log) skill premium is important in part because it is a key market outcome, reecting
the relative price of skills in the labor market. The evolution of this skill premium is also the key
yardstick in Goldin and Katzs analysis of the race between education and technology. Equation
(5) shows that there is a simple log-linear relationship between the skill premium and the relative
supply of skills as measured by H=L. Equivalently, equation (5) implies:
@ ln!
@ lnH=L
=   1

< 0:
6The important assumption is that workers do not have a choice on whether to supply high or low skill labor
to the market depending on prices or sets of tasks being performed in the economy.
7 In studying the college/high-school premium, Goldin and Katz parameterize this elasticity as xed. In
studying the high-school graduate/dropout premium, they use a time-varying elasticity to allow high school
graduate and high school dropout labor to become more substitutable over time.
8Shifts in  can be thought of as skill-replacing technical changes in that they directly change the demand for
one skill group at the expense of the other, and Goldin and Katz allow  to be time-varying. This reduced-form
method of modeling skill-replacing technical change is serviceable but does not have clear microfoundations and
so is not commonly used in practice.
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This relationship corresponds to the second of the two forces in Tinbergens race. For a given
skill bias of technology, captured here by AH=AL, an increase in the relative supply of skills,
H=L, reduces the skill premium with an elasticity of 1=.
The downward sloping relationship between relative supply and the skill premium implies
that if technology, in particular AH=AL, had remained roughly constant over recent decades, the
remarkable increase in the supply of skills shown in Figure 1 below would have led to a signicant
decline in the skill premium. The lack of such a decline is a powerful piece of evidence for Goldin
and Katzs conclusion that the rst force in Tinbergens race changes in technology that raised
the demand for skills must have been important throughout the 20th century.
Formally, di¤erentiating (5) with respect to AH=AL yields:
@ ln!
@ ln(AH=AL)
=
   1

: (6)
Equation (6) implies that if  > 1 (i.e., high and low skill labor are gross complements), then
relative improvements in the high skill augmenting technology (i.e., in AH=AL) increase the skill
premium. This can be seen as a shift out of the relative demand curve for skills.9
The key equation of the canonical model, (5), links the skill premium to the relative supply
of skills, H=L, and to the relative technology term, AH=AL. This last term is not directly
observed. Nevertheless, we can make considerable empirical progress by taking a specic form
of Tinbergens hypothesis. For example, one can assume, as is generally done in the literature,
that there is a log linear trend increase in the demand for skills over time caused by ongoing
technological change, so that ln (AH;t=AL;t) = 0 + 1t, where t is calendar time (and variables
written with t subscript refer to these variables at time t). Substituting this equation into (5),
we obtain:
ln!t = constant+
   1

0 +
   1

1t 
1

ln

Ht
Lt

: (7)
Equation (7) implies that technological improvements take place at a constant proportional
rate, while the supply of skilled workers may grow at varying rates at di¤erent points in times.
Changes in the skill premium will result when the growth rate of the supply of skills di¤ers from
9The converse is obtained when  < 1: that is, when  < 1, an increase in AH , relative to AL, shifts the relative
demand curve inward and reduces the skill premium. Consider, for example, how factor-augmenting technology
change a¤ects the wages of the augmented factor when the production function is Leontief (xed proportions).
In this case, as AH increases, high skill workers become more productive, and hence the demand for low skill
workers increases by more than the demand for high skill workers. This observation raises an important caveat. It
is tempting to interpret improvements in technologies used by high skill workers, AH , as skill biased. However,
when the elasticity of substitution is less than 1, it will be advances in technologies used with low skill workers,
AL, that increase the relative productivity and wages of high skill workers, and an increase in AH relative to AL
will be unskilled labor biased. While the case of  < 1 is interesting, in the context of the substitution between
college and non-college workers, a relatively high elasticity of substitution is both plausible and consistent with
many studies. Most estimates put  in this context to be somewhere between 1.4 and 2, so we focus on this case
throughout this essay.
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the pace of technological progress: when H=L grows faster than the rate of skill-biased technical
change, (   1) 1, the skill premium will fall; when the supply growth falls short of this rate,
the skill premium will increase.
Though most analyses of the canonical model focus on its implications for the skill premium,
the model also has sharp predictions on the levels of wages. In particular, it can be veried
easily that the model implies @wL=@AL > 0 and @wL=@AH > 0 (and similarly for @wH=@AH
and @wH=@AL). That is, factor-augmenting technical change increases wages of both low skill
and high skill workers (except in the limiting cases where  = 0 and  = 1 in which case
these inequalities can be weak). This result is intuitive. It will also turn out to be important:
technological improvements of any sort will lead to higher wages for both skill groups in the
canonical model. Thus unless there is technical regress,the canonical model does not predict
a decline in the real wage of a factor whose relative supply is not shifting outward.
3.2 The Power of the Canonical Model
To demonstrate the power and utility of the canonical model, we begin by replicating the inuen-
tial analysis of Katz and Murphy (1992). Katz-Murphy used data from the Current Population
Survey for earnings years 1963 through 1987 to explore the relationship between the relative
supply of skills in the U.S. economy and the evolution of the skill premium. Specically, they t
equation (7) to time-series measures (calculated from the CPS microdata) of the college/high-
school relative wage and college/high-school relative labor supply for the years 1963 through
1987. Following their methods as closely as possible, the rst column of Table 1 presents an
OLS regression of the composition-adjusted college/high-school log weekly wage premium (Fig-
ure 2) on a linear time trend and our measure of college/high-school log relative supply (Figure
1) for years 19631987. We obtain the estimate:
ln!t = constant + 0:027 t   0:612  ln

Ht
Lt

:
(0:005) (0:128)
As shown in Figure 3 as well as the rst column of Table 1, this simple specication performs
quite well in capturing the broad features of the evolving college premium between 1963 and
1987, most notably, the sharp reversal of the trajectory of the college premium coinciding with
the deceleration in the growth of college relative supply in the late 1970s. The power of the model
is underscored by Figure 4, which plots the college premium and college relative supply measures
by year, each purged of a linear time trend. The robust inverse relationship between these two
series demonstrates the key role played by the decelerating supply of college workers in driving
the college premium upward in recent decades. More precisely, the estimates suggest that the
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evolution of the college premium during the period 1963 through 1987 can be characterized by
an elasticity of substitution between college graduate workers and non-college workers of about
^ = 1=0:61  1:6, and an annual increase of about 2:7 percent in the relative demand for college
labor.10
Column 2 of Table 1 includes 21 additional years of data beyond 1987 to extend the Katz-
Murphy estimate to 2008. When t to this longer time period, the model yields a substantially
higher estimate of the elasticity of substitution, ^  2:9; and a slower trend rate of demand
growth (1:6 percent annually).11 The proximate cause of this change in the models estimated
parameters can be seen in Figure 3, which, following Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008), plots
the out-of-sample t of the Katz-Murphy model for the years 1987-2008. The t of the model
remains quite good through the year 1992, ve years out of sample. But the model systematically
deviates from the data thereafter, predicting a sharper rise in the college premium than occurs.
While the observed college premium rose by 12 points between 1992 and 2008, the model predicts
a rise of 25 log points.
Without further renements to the model, the discrepancy between the observed and pre-
dicted growth of the college premium suggests that either the trend in relative demand decel-
erated after 1992 or the elasticity of substitution rose. Subsequent columns of Table 1 explore
the rst possibility by freeing up the linear time trend with less restrictive parameterizations:
a linear spline that allows the time trend to deviate from its initial trajectory after 1992; a
quadratic time trend; and a cubic time trend. When t to the data, all three of these variants
suggest a signicant deceleration in the trend for the relative demand for college workers oc-
curring sometime during the 1990s. Conditional on the more exible time trend, the elasticity
of substitution in these estimates returns to the range of 1:6 to 1:8. At face value, this model
suggests that relative demand for college workers decelerated in the 1990s, which does not accord
with common intuitions regarding the nature or pace of technological changes occurring in this
era.
The simple exercise above highlights several strengths and limitations of the simple education
race model. A key strength is parsimony. Using only two time series, one of relative wages, the
other of relative supplies, Goldin and Katz show that the model does a remarkably good job
of explaining the evolution of the skill premium over nine decades (from 1915 to 2005) and, by
implication, quantifying the contribution of skill-biased technical change to this phenomenon.
Moreover, a host of careful studies, reviewed in Goldin and Katz and in Acemoglu and Autor
10Our estimates are very similar, though not identical, to those of Katz and Murphy, who nd an elasticity of
substitution of 1:4 and a time trend of 3:3 percent.
11This point is explored by Card and DiNardo (2002), Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008), and Goldin and Katz
(Table 8.2).
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(2010), conrm the explanatory power of this simple supply-demand framework for explaining
trends in the college-versus-high-school earnings gap across other industrialized economies (most
notably, the United Kingdom and Canada), among age and education groups within countries,
and across birth states and birth cohorts within the United States.
But the data also reveal some puzzles for the model, which we highlight next. We then
consider whether these puzzles can be potentially better addressed by an extended conceptual
framework that permits a richer set of interactions among available skill supplies, technological
change, and the assignment of both labor and capital to the set of tasks in use in the economy.
3.3 Challenges for the Canonical Model
Observed versus Predicted Wage Inequality
A rst puzzle, already visible from Table 1 and Figure 3, is that from the early 1990s to the
present, wage inequality (as measured by the college/high-school log wage gap) rose substantially
less than predicted by the model. This divergence may or may not be important in its own
right after all, the model is still qualitatively on target but it raises the question of what
has changed. A second notably divergent pattern, seen in Figures 5a and 5b and highlighted in
earlier work by Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006 and 2008), is that since the early 1990s, wages
in the top, middle and bottom of the income distribution have evolved in quite distinct and
somewhat unexpected directions. Most notably, while both the 90th and 10th percentiles of the
weekly and hourly wage distributions diverged rapidly from the median from the early 1980s to
the early-1990s consistent with a rising return to skill in the canonical model the gap between
the 10th percentile and the median substantially contracted over the next 15 years even as the
90/50 gap continued to rapidly expand. This suggests that, at the very least, it may be useful
to distinguish between high, middle and low skill workers rather than just between high and low
skill workers as is typically done in the canonical model.
Falling Real Wages of Low-Skill Workers
Another fact that underscores the shortcomings of the canonical model is the surprising evo-
lution of real (rather than relative) wage levels. The canonical model of factor-augmenting
technical change robustly predicts that demand shifts favoring skilled workers will raise the skill
premium and boost the real earnings of all skill groups (e.g., college and high school workers),
as highlighted above. This prediction appears strikingly at odds with the data, as rst reported
by Katz and Murphy (1992) and shown in Figure 6.12 This gure plots the evolution of real
12For compactness, we plot most series in this section for male workers only.
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log earnings by gender and education for the same samples of full-time, full-year workers used
above. Each series is normalized at zero in the starting year of 1963, with subsequent values
corresponding to the log change in earnings for each group relative to the base year. All values
are deated using the Personal Consumption Expenditure Deator produced by the U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis.
Figure 5 reveals three key facts about the evolution of earnings by education groups that
are not evident from the earlier plots of the college/high-school wage premium. First, a sizable
share of the increase in college relative to non-college wages in 1980 forward is explained by rising
wages of post-college workers, i.e., those with post-baccalaureate degrees. Real earnings for this
group increased steeply and nearly continuously from at least the early 1980s to present. By
contrast, earnings growth among those with exactly a four-year degree was much more modest.
For example, real wages of males with exactly a four-year degree rose 13 log points in the three
decades between 1979 and 2008. This appears paltry when compared to the 20 log point increase
in male college wages in the rst ten years of the sample.
A second fact evident from the gure is that a major proximate cause of the growing
college/high-school premium is steeply declining wages among less educated workers especially
less educated males rather than rising wages among college workers. Real earnings of males
with less than a four year college degree fell steeply between 1979 and 1992, by 12 log points
for high school and some-college males, and by 20 log points for high school dropouts. Low-skill
male wages modestly rebounded between 1993 and 2003 but never reached their 1980 levels. For
females, the picture is qualitatively similar but the slopes are more favorable. While wages for
low-skill males were falling in the 1980s, wages for low-skill females were largely stagnant; when
low-skill males wages increased modestly in the 1990s, low-skill female wages rose approximately
twice as fast.13
The third key fact evident from Figure 5 is that while the earnings gaps between some-college,
high school graduate, and high school dropout workers expanded sharply in the 1980s, these gaps
stabilized thereafter. In particular, the wages of high school dropouts, high school graduates,
and those with some college moved largely in parallel from the early 1990s forward paralleling
the movements of the 10th and 50th wage percentiles, respectively, in Figure 5.
13A potential concern with the interpretation of these results is that the measured real wage declines of less-
educated workers mask an increase in their total compensation after accounting for the rising value of employer
provided non-wage benets such as healthcare, vacation and sick time. This concern is discussed in Acemoglu
and Autor (2010) and dismissed drawing largely on Pierce (2001 and 2010) and Hamermesh (1999).
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Polarization of Earnings Growth
The net e¤ect of these three trends rising college and post-college wages, stagnant and falling
real wages for those without a four-year college degree, and stabilizing wage gaps among some-
college, high school graduates, and high school dropout workers is that starting in the past two
decades, earnings growth has become increasingly non-montone in skill and wage levels, with
more rapid growth at the upper and (surprisingly) lower deciles of the wage distribution than
at the median.
This pattern is seen in Figure 7, which plots changes in hourly wages relative to the change
at the median by earnings percentile among male workers between 1974 and 2008.14 We divide
the sample into two time intervals that roughly capture the changing dynamics of earnings
inequality. During the initial period of 1974 through 1988, the monotonicity of wage changes
by percentile is evident. Equally visible is the U-shaped (or polarized) growth of wages by
percentile in the 1988 through 2008 period. Interestingly, the steep gradient of wage changes
above the median is nearly parallel for these two time intervals. Thus, the key di¤erence between
these periods turns on the evolution of the lower-tail, which fell steeply in the 1980s and then
regained ground relative to the median thereafter.
This U-shaped growth of wage levels over the last two decades is clearly di¢ cult to interpret
in a model with only two skill groups. One can of course posit that the levels and distribution of
h and l the distribution of e¢ ciency units of high and low skill labor within the population
shifted in a manner that generates apparent non-monotonicity even with only two underlying
skill prices. But without supporting evidence, this explanation appears ad hoc.
Occupational Polarization
Accompanying the wage polarization depicted above is a marked pattern of job polarization, by
which we mean the simultaneous growth of employment in high-skill, high-wage occupations and
low-skill, low-wage occupations. Figure 8 illustrates this phenomenon by plotting the change
over each of the last three decades in the share of U.S. employment accounted for by 318 detailed
occupations encompassing all of U.S. employment and ranked (on the x -axis) by their skill level
from lowest to highest. Here, an occupations skill rank is proxied by the average wage of its
workers in 1980. The y-axis of the gure corresponds to the change in employment at each
occupational percentile as a share of total U.S. employment during the decade. Since the sum
of shares must equal one in each decade, the change in these shares across decades must total
14Consistent hourly earnings data are available for the period 1973 through 2008 from the Current Population
Survey. To increase precision, we pool three adjacent years of data for each series.
15
zero.15
The gure reveals a striking reversal of occupational employment changes between the early
and later years of the sample, paralleling the polarization of earnings. Between 1979 and 1989,
occupational employment growth was nearly monotone in occupational skill; occupations below
the median declined as a share of employment and occupations above the median increased.
Between 1990 and 2007, relative employment growth was again most rapid at high percentiles
but it was also strongly positive at lower percentiles, with the growth of occupational employment
shares almost as rapid at the 10th percentile as at the 80th percentile.
Figure 9 documents the broad changes in occupational structure that drive job polarization
in the United States by plotting the change in employment by decade for the years 1979 through
2010 for 10 major occupational groups encompassing all of U.S. non-agricultural employment.
We separately plot the three recession years of 2007 through 2010 so as not to conate cyclical
with secular changes.16
The occupations depicted in the gure cluster into three broad groups. On the right-hand
side of the gure are managerial, professional and technical occupations. These are highly-
educated and highly-paid occupations. Employment growth in these occupations was robust
throughout the three decades plotted. Even in the years 2007 through 2010, during which U.S.
employment fell by approximately 7 million workers, these occupations experienced almost no
absolute decline in employment.
Moving towards the center of the gure, the next four columns display employment growth
in middle-skill occupations, comprised of four categories: o¢ ce and administrative support
occupations; sales occupations; production, craft and repair occupations; and operator, fabri-
cator and laborer occupations. The rst two categories are white-collar occupations that are
disproportionately held by women with a high school degree or some college. The latter two
categories are blue-collar occupations that are disproportionately held by males with a high
school degree or lower education. While the headcount in these occupations rose in each interval
depicted between 1979-2007, their growth rate lagged the economy-wide average and, moreover,
generally slowed across decades. These occupations were hit particularly hard after 2007, with
absolute declines in employment ranging from 7 to 17 percent.
Finally, the left-most three columns of Figure 9 depict employment trends in service occupa-
tions, which the Census Bureau denes as jobs that involve helping, caring for or assisting others.
15These series are smoothed using a locally weighted regression to reduce jumpiness when measuring employment
shifts at such a narrow level of aggregation. Due to smoothing, the sum of share changes may not integrate precisely
to zero.
16The patterns are very similar, however, if we instead use the Census/ACS data, which cover the period 1959
through 2007 (see Table 3 for comparison).
16
The majority of workers in service occupations have no post-secondary education, and hourly
wages in these occupations are generally below the other seven categories depicted. Employment
growth in service occupations has been consistently positive over the past three decades. Indeed,
Autor and Dorn (2010) show that rising service occupation employment accounts for almost the
entirety of the upward twist of the lower tail of Figure 8 during the 1990s and 2000s. All three
subcategories of service occupations protective services, food preparation, cleaning services,
and personal care expanded by double digits in the 1990s and the pre-recession years of the
past decade (1999 through 2007). Protective service and food preparation and cleaning occu-
pations also expanded rapidly during the 1980s. Notably, even after 2007, employment growth
in service occupations was modestly positive despite the deep recession more so, in fact, than
the three high-skilled occupations on the right-hand side of the gure.17
This pattern of employment polarization is not unique to the United States. Figure 10,
sourced from Goos, Manning and Salomons (2009, Table 1), depicts the change in the share of
overall employment between 1993 and 2006 in each of 16 European Union countries accounted
for by three mutually exclusive occupational categories low, medium, and high skill grouped
according to their average wage level.18 Employment polarization is quite pronounced across the
E.U.; the unweighted average decline in middle-skill employment across countries is 8 percentage
points. In all 16 countries depicted, middle-wage occupations declined as a share of employment,
with the largest declines in France and Austria (12 and 14 percentage points, respectively)
and the smallest decline in Portugal (1 percentage point). In 13 of 16 countries, high-wage
occupations increased their share of employment, with an average gain of 6 percentage points,
while low-wage occupations grew as a share of employment in 11 of 16 countries. Notably, in all
16 countries, low-wage occupations increased in size relative to middle-wage occupations, with
a mean gain in employment in low relative to middle wage occupations of 10 percentage points.
As indicated by the last two sets of columns in Figure 9, job polarization appears to be at least
as pronounced in the European Union as in the United States.
Cumulatively, these two trends rapid employment growth in both high and low-education
jobs have substantially reduced the share of employment accounted for by middle skilljobs.
In 1979, the four middle skill occupations sales, o¢ ce and administrative workers, production
workers, and operatives accounted for 58.9 percent of employment. In 2007, this number was
47.5 percent, and in 2010, it was 44.5 percent.
17The employment share of service occupations was essentially at between 1959 and 1979. Their rapid growth
since 1980 marks a sharp trend reversal.
18The choice of time period for this gure reects the availability of consistent Harmonized European Labor
Force data. The ranking of occupations by wage/skill level is assumed identical across countries, as necessitated
by data limitations. Goos, Manning and Salomons report that the ranking of occupations by wage level is highly
comparable across E.U. countries.
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Challenges for the Canonical Model: Summing Up
We believe that these discrepancies between the data and the predictions of the canonical
model specically, the heterogeneous behavior of the top, middle and bottom of the earn-
ings distribution, falling real wages of some skill groups, polarization of earnings growth, and
polarization of occupational growth are su¢ ciently important to warrant enriching the canon-
ical model to gain leverage on these trends. We turn to this task next. Subsequently, we briey
revisit these facts to ask whether the enhanced model can in fact o¤er leverage.
4 Beyond the Standard Model
Many of the shortcomings of the canonical model can, we believe, be overcome by relaxing the
implicit equivalence between workersskills and their job tasks in the model. In our terminology,
a task is a unit of work activity that produces output. A skill is a workers stock of capabilities for
performing various tasks. Workers apply their skill endowments to tasks in exchange for wages.
Thus, the task-based approaches emphasize that skills are applied to tasks to produce output
skills do not directly produce output. The distinction between skills and tasks is irrelevant if
workers of a given skill always perform the same set of tasks. The distinction becomes important,
however, when the assignment of skills to tasks is evolving with time, either because shifts in
market prices mandate reallocation of skills to tasks or because the set of tasks demanded in
the economy is altered by technological developments, trade, or o¤shoring.
To highlight how a task-based approach can enrich and strengthen the emphasis of Goldin
and Katz, we summarize a simple task-based framework proposed in Acemoglu and Autor (2010),
which builds on Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and Costinot
and Vogel (2011). Goldin and Katz have also explored closely related ideas in other recent pub-
lications, for example, Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006, 2008) and Goldin and Katz (2007), but
have chosen not to focus on them in the book given their intended broad audience.19 Distinct
from the canonical model, this framework explicitly incorporates the possibility that techno-
logical change or international trade will cause some tasks previously performed by domestic
workers to either be replaced by capital or substituted by workers abroad. This provides a
natural mechanism through which technological advances importantly even factor-augmenting
technological change can lead to real declines in the wages for certain groups of workers as well
as non-monotone changes in the structure of employment by occupation.
19They have instead gone some way towards incorporating the notion of skill-replacing technical changes we
focus on here by making the distribution parameter in the CES production function (3), , time-varying. As
commented in footnote 8, this is somewhat ad hoc as it is unclear what sorts of changes in technology would a¤ect
.
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The model also has two foundational features that we view as particularly useful. First,
it nests the canonical model as one parametric case; thus, this model builds upon rather than
dispenses with the many strengths of the canonical model. Secondly, the model removes what
we think of as an articial set of distinctions typically made between labor, capital, and trade (or
o¤shoring) in canonical models of production where di¤erent factors of production play distinct
and often incommensurate roles. In the current model, the fundamental units of production are
job tasks, which are combined to produce output. Tasks can be supplied by domestic labor,
foreign labor, or capital, the capabilities of which may change over time. The allocation of both
labor and capital to tasks is determined in equilibrium by comparative advantage, which is in
turn a function of factor-task specic productivities and the market clearing price of each factor.
4.1 A simple model of tasks and skills
We consider a static environment with a unique nal good. For now, the economy is closed and
there is no trade in tasks (a possibility we allow for later). The unique nal good is produced
by combining a continuum of tasks represented by the unit interval, [0; 1]. Suppose, to simplify
the analysis, that the technology combining the services of tasks is a constant elasticity of
substitution aggregator, so that the nal good is produced as
Y =
Z 1
0
y(i)
 1
 di
 
 1
; (8)
where Y denotes the output of a unique nal good, y (i) is the serviceor production level of
task i, and  is the elasticity of substitution between tasks. Acemoglu and Autor (2010) studied
the Cobb-Douglascase where  = 1, or equivalently, lnY =
R 1
0 ln y(i)di. For our discussion
here, it is su¢ cient to focus on this case.
Suppose that there are three types of labor, high, medium and low skilled workers, who
inelastically supply L, M and H units of labor respectively. At any given point in time, a subset
I  [0; 1] of the potentially feasible tasks is available (the remaining tasks cannot be produced).
Each of the available tasks has the following production function
y(i) = ALL (i) l(i) +AMM (i)m(i) +AHH (i)h(i) +AKK (i) k(i); (9)
where A terms represent factor-augmenting technology, and L (i), M (i) and H (i) are the
task productivity schedules, designating the productivity of low, medium and high skill workers
in di¤erent tasks. In particular, L (i) is the productivity of low skill workers in task i, and l (i) is
the number of low skill workers allocated to task i. The remaining terms are dened analogously.
Similarly, K (i) is the task productivity schedule of capital and k (i) is the amount of capital
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allocated to task i: Analogously to the canonical model, we can think of AL; AM and AH as
low, medium and high skill factor, factor-augmenting technological changes. Distinct from the
canonical model, however, a factor-augmenting technological change need not increase the wages
of all factors in this setup, as we subsequently discuss.
Though each task can be performed by low, medium or high skill workers or by capital, the
comparative advantage of skill groups di¤ers across tasks, as captured by the  terms. These dif-
ferences in comparative advantage are central to understanding the interplay of tasks and skills.
In particular, we impose the following simple structure of comparative advantage: L (i) =M (i)
and M (i) =H (i) are (strictly) decreasing. This assumption can be interpreted as stating that
higher indices correspond to more complextasks in which high skill workers are better than
medium skill workers and medium skill workers are better than low skill workers. Though
not very restrictive, this assumption ensures a particularly simple and tight characterization
of equilibrium in this economy. We ignore for the moment the task productivity schedule of
capital.20
Factor market clearing requiresZ 1
0
l(i)di  L,
Z 1
0
m(i)di M and
Z 1
0
h(i)di  H: (10)
The structure of the models equilibrium is derived in Acemoglu and Autor (2010), and we
provide only minimal details here. Because of the simple structure of comparative advantage
outlined above, the equilibrium of the model involves a partition of the continuum of tasks into
three adjacent sets: the least complex set of tasks, those on the interval 0  i  IL , will be
supplied by L workers; an intermediate set of tasks on the interval IL < i  IH will be supplied
by M workers; and the remaining highest skill set on the interval IH < i  1 will be supplied by
H workers. Crucially, IL and IH , which are the cut-points of the task partition, are endogenously
determined in the model.
Competitive labor markets require that the law of one price for skill applies. Each unit
of L labor will receive a wage WL, and similarly for units of M and H labor. Additionally,
since each task can potentially be performed by any skill group, the allocation of tasks to skill
groups is governed by a no arbitrage condition: for the marginal task located at IL, the cost of
performing this task must be identical in equilibrium whether it is supplied by L or M workers.
Similarly, the cost of performing task IH must in equilibrium be equated between M or H
workers. For tasks on the interior of these sets (i < IL; IL < i < IH , and i > IH), however,
20The canonical model can be nested within this framework trivially by ignoring middle skill workers and
assuming that L (i) = L > 0 and H (i) = 0 for all i  { and L (i) = 0 and H (i) = H>0 for all i > {.
Acemoglu and Autor (2010) discuss other ways in which the model admits special cases similar to the canonical
model.
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workers of the relevant skill groups hold strict comparative advantage. Using these conditions,
it is straightforward to demonstrate that there will exist a unique IL and I

H that jointly satisfy
the law of one price, the no arbitrage condition, and the market clearing condition in (10).
4.2 Implications for Interpreting Patterns of Wages and Employment
A key strength of the model presented above is that it facilitates a more nuanced view of the
nature of technological shifts, which together with changes in the supply of skills, underlie the
bulk of the changes in the earnings distribution over the last several decades. At a basic level,
the distinction between high, middle and low skills adds an important degree of freedom to the
model, allowing for non-monotone movements in wage levels and wage inequality as seen in the
data.
A second distinction is that, while factor-augmenting technological improvements always
increase the real earnings of both skilled and unskilled workers in the canonical model, this may
not be so in the presence of endogenous allocation of workers to tasks. Acemoglu and Autor
(2010) show that a factor-augmenting technological improvements (e.g., an increase in AH) can
reduce the wages of middle skill workers. In particular, this happens when new technologies,
by increasing the productivity of high skill workers, encourage some of the tasks previously
performed by middle skill workers to be shifted to high skill workers, but a corresponding shift
of low skill tasks to middle skill workers is not protable.21
Arguably the most important innovation o¤ered by this task-based framework is that it can
be used to investigate the implications of capital (embodied in machines) directly displacing
workers from tasks that they previously performed. In general, we expect that tasks performed
by all three skill groups are subject to machine displacement. Based on the patterns documented
in the data above, as well as the general characterization of machine-task substitution o¤ered
by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), however, we believe the set of tasks most subject to
machine displacement in the current era are those that are routine or codiable.22 Such tasks
are primarily, though not exclusively, performed by medium skill workers (e.g., high school
graduates and those with less than a four-year college degree). For this reason, let us suppose
that there now exists a range of tasks [I 0; I 00]  [IL; IH ] for which K (i) increases su¢ ciently
(with xed cost of capital r) so that they are now more economically preformed by machines
than middle skill workers. For all the remaining tasks, i.e., for all i =2 [I 0; I 00], we continue to
assume that K (i) = 0.
21Loosely, this happens when IH shifts down considerably while IL does not change by much.
22Tasks with these attributes may also be particularly well suited to o¤shoring since their codaability makes
them readily tradeable as the price of communications falls (also a technological change).
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What are the implications of this type of technological change for the supply of di¤erent types
of tasks and for wages? We answer this question formally in Acemoglu and Autor (2010). Even
without such a formalization, however, it is straightforward to see why this form of technological
change has the potential to generate the patterns of wage changes and polarization documented
above: a task-replacing technological change can directly reduce wages of a skill group even as
it raises total output. Intuitively, a task-replacing technological change squeezes out the type of
worker previously performing these tasks, thereby creating excess supply.Consequently, these
workers are reallocated to tasks for which they have lower comparative advantage, which pushes
their wages down. Simultaneously, by reducing the cost, and hence increasing the intensity of
use, of the newly automated tasks, the task-replacing technological change complements each of
the remaining tasks performed by labor.
Though these countervailing e¤ects imply that the real wage of the group that is directly
displaced by technology in a subset of its original tasks does not have to fall in real terms, such
an outcome is possible perhaps even likely in realistic cases. In consequence, the task-based
framework sketched above can readily rationalize falling real wage levels for some skill groups.
This set of observations explains why middle-skill task-replacing technological change can
lead to wage polarization. By eroding the initial comparative advantage of the middle-skill group
in a given set of tasks, the technological shift in e¤ect shunts the displaced skill group into a
set of tasks in which it was initially less productive. This depresses the groups wage relative to
both L and H workers.23
The polarization of occupational employment also follows from this mechanism. As demon-
strated in the plots above, the occupations that have contracted most rapidly as a share of
total employment over the last three decades are reasonably well characterized as routine task-
intensive activities. Specically, many of the tasks historically performed by production, clerical,
administrative support and sales workers have become fallow for automation as the cost of com-
puter hardware has declined and the sophistication of software has advanced. Notice however
that this process does not imply that these displaced tasks are obsolete in fact, just the op-
posite. As the cost of performing routine tasks has declined by orders of magnitude, their use
in production has grown explosively think, for example, of the amount of processing power
that goes into a single Google query. However, because these tasks are now performed by cap-
23As detailed in Acemoglu and Autor (2010), there are also interesting general equilibrium e¤ects on other skill
groups. As the middle-skill group is displaced, the task boundaries will change, encroaching on the other two skill
groups. The relative degree of encroachment on L versus H workers depends on the shape of the comparative
advantage schedules in the neighborhood of the initial set boundaries. If H workers have strong comparative
advantage relative to M in their initial tasks, then the upper boundary will move little. If L workers have
relatively weak comparative advantage in their initial tasks, then the predominant direction of task reassignment
will be that tasks previously performed by L workers are reallocated to M workers.
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ital rather than labor, the consequences for the earnings power of workers who previously held
comparative advantage in these tasks are at best ambiguous.
This process potentially catalyzes labor market polarization because as workers are displaced
from routine task-intensive occupations, a greater mass of skills is reallocated towards the tails
of the occupational distribution both towards high skill analytic, reasoning and problem solv-
ing tasks and, ironically, towards traditionally low skill, in-person service tasks. Hence, this
conceptual framework can readily accommodate what computer scientists refer to as Moravecs
paradox, specically, that it is comparatively easy to make computers exhibit adult level per-
formance on intelligence tests or playing checkers, and di¢ cult or impossible to give them the
skills of a one-year-old when it comes to perception and mobility(Moravec, 1988, p. 15).
We do not wish to suggest that this model resolves the puzzles posed above; to some degree,
it was purpose-built to interpret them. Our claim or at least our hope is that this framework
is a productive conceptual tool for confronting key facts that currently lie beyond the canonical
models scope. We next ask whether this same framework redresses any of the limitations of the
standard growth accounting exercise above.
4.3 Rethinking the Contribution of Human Capital to Growth
As we saw above, Goldin and Katz quantify the contribution of human capital to economic
growth using an accounting framework with human capital represented as a single aggregate
factor. This choice may at rst appear at odds with Goldin and Katzs emphasis on the canonical
model in which there is a central distinction between skilled and unskilled labor (e.g., the
aggregate production function (3)). Nevertheless, their approach is justied under the standard
assumptions used in the literature as we now explain. As is well known, Solow-type growth
accounting recovers the contribution of di¤erent factors of production and technology under
three conditions: the aggregate production function exhibits constant returns to scale; there
are no production externalities (so that market prices capture social marginal products); and
changes in each factor are small.
Under these assumptions, one can indeed use an aggregate of human capital, X, constructed
as e¢ ciency units of labor, in place of separate measures of skilled and unskilled workers. This
follows because the growth accounting approach uses a rst-order approximation to the aggre-
gate production function, and this approximation is arbitrarily close to the underlying function
when we consider small enough changes in factor supplies. To illustrate this point in greater
detail, consider a hybrid of (1) and (3) with capital and skilled and unskilled labor, L and H:
Y = ~F

K;
h
(ALL)
 1
 + (AHH)
 1

i 
 1

; (11)
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where the production function ~F exhibits constant returns to scale. The growth accounting
equation in this case, with a logic similar to (2), can be written as
gY = gA +
RK
Y
gK +
wLL
Y
gL +
wHH
Y
gH ; (12)
where gZ again denotes the growth rate of variable Z, and gA is the contribution of technological
progress, driven, for example, by changes in AL and AH , again computed as the residual from
the growth accounting exercise.
Instead of entering the supply of unskilled and skilled labor, L andH, directly into the growth
accounting exercise, however, one can aggregate them into a single stock of human capital using
the following measure of the aggregate stock of human capital,
X = L+
wH
wL
H = L+ !H: (13)
This approach will nd an identical contribution of human capital to growth as in the full
accounting framework in (12) for small enough changes in factor supplies.24 In consequence,
Goldin and Katzs use of an aggregate human capital measure in the place of separate skill
groups in the growth accounting exercise does not cause their analysis to underestimate the
contribution of human capital to growth.
Nevertheless, one of the assumptions upon which the growth accounting exercise relies is
potentially problematic: specically, that changes in the factors of production over time are
small so the rst order approximation in equation (12) is stable. This assumption is formalized
in the growth accounting framework and in the above treatment by considering derivatives with
respect to continuous time, so changes over time are arbitrarily small. If, however, there are
large changes in factor supplies or technologies that alter the shares of factors in national income,
all of these equations become rough approximations that can in principle go wrong.25
Given the rapid increase in the supply of di¤erent types of human capital and the consequent
changes in prices, which Goldin and Katz themselves comprehensively document, this assump-
tion of factor share stability may not be a good approximation to reality. In this case, correctly
specifying the functional form of the aggregate production function, including the exact form of
24To see this equivalence result, recall that X denotes total e¢ ciency units of labor as dened in (13). From this
denition, it follows that if X is properly measured, wX will be the same as the unskilled wage, wL essentially
all labor is remunerated as di¤erent e¢ ciency units of unskilled labor. Now di¤erentiating (13), and rearranging,
we also have
gX =
L
X
gL +
!H
X
gH :
Substituting this into (2), the growth accounting equation from Section 2, and using the fact that wL = wX , we
recover (12), the growth accounting equation from the production function explicitly distinguishing skilled and
unskilled labor.
25 In fact, Goldin and Katz do impose the Cobb-Douglas functional form between physical and human capital,
as a further functional form restriction.
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substitution between di¤erent types of skills, becomes crucial.26 Using an aggregate production
function that does not distinguish between skilled and unskilled labor may then understate (or
overstate) the contribution of human capital to growth.
This concern becomes more salient when the multifaceted nature of human capital and the
endogenous allocation of this human capital to tasks is taken into account. This is not only
because the pattern of substitution between di¤erent types of human capital becomes richer,
but also because the value of di¤erent types of human capital crucially depends on the set of
(evolving) tasks.
To elaborate on this point, let us return to the task-based framework introduced in this
section, and suppose, as seems plausible, that in the U.S. economy, the increase in educational
attainments went hand in hand with expansions in the set of tasks It e.g., from

0; It

to
0; It+1

, where It+1 > It. This simultaneous increase in human capital and the complexity of
job tasks employed in the economy would have several implications. First, the changes in the
prices of di¤erent types of skills would very much depend on the changes in the set of tasks in
use. For instance, if the periods in which there are large increases in the supply of the highest
type of human capital are also those in which there is a large expansion in the set of tasks (i.e.,
It+1 is signicantly greater than It), then using an approximation to the production function
that keeps the set of tasks at [0; It] may seriously underestimate the contribution of human
capital to growth.
Second, and relatedly, such an approach might provide one potential explanation for why
some largely agricultural countries in sub-Saharan Africa and other relatively poor parts of the
globe have seen rapid increases in education without a corresponding rise in national incomes.27
In these economies, it is possible that the supply of human capital has increased without a
correspondingly rapid increase in the set of tasks requiring skilled workers.28
4.4 Some Initial Evidence from U.S. States
The ideas discussed in the previous subsection are speculative and there is no hard evidence as
yet to suggest that they are empirically relevant. In this section, we take a rst step towards
26See Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), where this point is raised in the context of the use of similar techniques
in cross-country data.
27See, for example, Pritchett (2001) and Easterly and Levine (2001) for regressions showing a weak or non-
existent relationship between changes in education and changes in income across di¤erent samples of countries.
Recent work by Hanushek and Woessman (2008) provides one potential explanation for this phenomenon: due to
poor education quality, nominal gains in schooling do not correspond to equivalent increases in skills.
28Third, and less related to the focus in this subsection, if the expansion of the set of tasks has recently
been important in the US economy, this might also provide a potential explanation for the convexication of
the education-earnings relationship discussed in Lemieux (2006) and Acemoglu and Autor (2010). Specically,
the expansion in the set of most advanced tasks may have increased the wage of high skill workers without a
corresponding increase in the demand for and the wages of middle skill workers.
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exploring them empirically, and we provide suggestive evidence they are a productive avenue
for understanding the interaction between human capital and economic growth. To do this, we
extend the regression framework proposed by Krueger and Lindahl (2001) for estimating the
role of human capital in cross-national development. Our extension of their approach allows
for interactions between the set of tasks in use in the economy and the contribution of human
capital to growth. If indeed the contribution of human capital to growth crucially depends on
the set of tasks in use, we would expect such interactions to be signicant and quantitatively
important. Applying this framework to U.S. states, for which we have access to high quality data
on schooling and measures of tasks (occupations) in use, we nd evidence that the contribution
of human capital to state-level output and growth does importantly depend on the set of tasks
currently in use.
Krueger and Lindahl quantify the cross-country relationship between human capital and
economic growth by estimating OLS models of the following form:
Yj;t = 1Sj;t + 2Sj;t 1 + 3Yj;t 1 + 4 Ij;t 1 + t + "j;t: (14)
In this equation, Yj;t is the change in the logarithm of GDP per capita in country j over
time interval t, Sj;t is the change in country js average years of completed schooling, Sj;t 1is
start of period schooling, Yj;t 1 is the start of period GDP, and t denotes a full set of time
e¤ects. This specication is motivated by a macroeconomic aggregation of the micro-founded
Mincerian worker-level earnings equation, which derives a log-linear relationship between years
of completed schooling and hourly earnings.29 Initial GDP is included in the macroeconomic
estimating equation to allow for income convergence among countries (implying that 3 < 0),
while inclusion of initial schooling allows for the possibility that a larger stock of human capital
may facilitate innovation and use of new technologies that boost GDP (implying that 2 > 0).
30
Fitting several variants of this simple model to a panel of countries, Krueger and Lindahl
conclude that both the change in and start-of-period level of schooling are robust predictors
of GDP growth, and that measurement errors in cross-national measures of average schooling
levels tend to substantially attenuate estimates of 1. To increase the signal to noise ratio
in measures of Sjt and reduce this attenuation problem, Krueger and Lindahl recommend
estimating equation (14) in long di¤erences of 5, 10 or 20 years.
29The log-linear specication arises because workers must be compensated for foregone labor earnings while
attending school, meaning that the (net) return to schooling must be roughly equal to the real rate of interest
(see, e.g., Acemoglu, 2009, Chapter 10). The quadratic function in years of potential experience typically used
in microeconomic wage equations is excluded from the macro-level model at the country level because years of
potential experience are highly correlated with expected lifespan, which is itself a function of economic development
and hence GDP.
30When the rate of return to schooling increases over time, 2 will also be positive.
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In Table 2, we apply this approach to estimating the relationship between education and
economic growth for the time interval of 1960 through 2007. Following the cross-country growth
literature, our dependent variable is the change in the log of state per-capita income (PCI),
which we obtain from decennial Census estimates for the years 1960 through 2000 and from the
American Community Survey pooled samples from 2006 through 2008.31 We calculate years of
schooling for state residents ages 18 through 65 using Census and ACS samples available from
IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2010). In addition to the regressors used by Krueger and Lindahl, we
construct a proxy for the range of tasks in use in each state, denoted by It above, measured
as the start-of-period fraction of state employment in professional, managerial and technical
occupations. Higher values of this occupational specialization measure, Ij;t, in our model would
imply that states produce with a larger range of tasks.
The rst column of Table 2 presents an estimate of (14) for pooled, state-level changes in
log GDP over (approximately) two-decade intervals between 1960 and 2007. Consistent with
Krueger and Lindahls cross-country results, column (1) of Table 2 shows a strong, positive
relationship between growth of average schooling and PCI across states. A one year increase in
school attainment predicts 9:7 log points of PCI growth, which is comparable both to Krueger
and Lindahls estimates (Table 3, page 1119) and to recent microeconomic estimates of the return
to a year of schooling in the United States and other English-speaking countries (Oreopoulos and
Salvanes, 2010). The column (1) estimate additionally shows that PCI growth was considerably
more rapid in states with initially higher GDP and with a greater share of initial employment
in complex occupations.
The next three columns of Table 2 extend the Krueger and Lindahl framework to investigate
the complementarities between human capital and the set of tasks in use by estimating the
following augmented version of (14)
Yj;t = 1Sj;t + 2Sj;t 1 + 3Yj;t 1 + 4 Ij;t 1 + 5Sj;t Ij;t 1 + t + "j;t; (15)
where we have added an interaction term between growth of state schooling levels and initial
state task complexity, Sjt Ij;t 1.32
Consistent with our expectations founded on the task-based framework presented above,
in column (2) we nd that this interaction term is estimated at 1:43 and is highly signicant
(standard error = 0:42). This suggests that a one year increase in average educational attainment
leads to about 7 log points additional growth in PCI over two decades in a state that has 5
31Sources: The Census data are available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/state/state3.html.
The ACS data were obtained from the American FactFinder http://factnder.census.gov.
32We de-mean each of the variables used to construct the interaction terms to eliminate the mechanical covari-
ance between the main e¤ects of these constituent variables and the resulting interaction terms.
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percentage points higher initial share of employment in complex occupations (relative to a state
with mean task complexity).33 This gain is over and above the 8:6 log points increase in PCI
per year of education for the average state.
In columns (3) and (4), we also include the interaction between PCI and the change in
schooling, Sj;tYj;t 1, either by itself or together with our variable of interest, Sj;t Ij;t 1. We
nd no signicant interaction between the change in schooling and initial state per capita income,
suggesting that it is not simply wealthier states that appear to gain more from schooling but
rather states specialized in more skill-intensive activities.
To provide a glimpse into the data underlying the regression, the two panels of Figure 11
depict the relationship between the change in schooling (on the x-axis) and the change in log
per capita income (on the y-axis) by state over 20-year intervals. Initial log per capita income is
partialled out of both the X and Y variables, and all variables are de-meaned within each time
interval. Observations where the initial skill content of jobs is in the upper half of the distribution
(relative to other states in the same year) are depicted with diamonds, while observations with
skill in the lower half are depicted with Os. Separate regression lines are shown for each. The rst
plot shows that states with above median initial task complexity appear to gain substantially
from additional years of schooling while states below the median do not. This null relationship
for the second group of states is sensitive to outliers, however. When these outliers are trimmed,
we nd a positive relationship between increases in average schooling and gains in PCI for both
groups of state. Nevertheless, the slope is more than twice as steep for states with above average
task complexity.34
The last four columns of Table 2 extend the estimating equation by allowing for di¤erent
slopes on years of post-secondary schooling and years of primary plus secondary schooling.35
An intriguing pattern that emerges from this extended model is that growth in schooling below
the post-secondary level is a strong predictor of state level PCI growth whereas growth in post-
secondary schooling is an economically small and statistically insignicant predictive relationship
to state growth. Conversely, the interaction term between initial task-complexity and growth in
years of post-secondary schooling is large and highly signicant, while the interaction between
initial task-complexity and growth of lower years of schooling is essentially zero. This pattern
33The mean of the complex occupation share variable rises from 0.21 in 1960 to 0.38 in 2007. Its cross-state
standard deviation is between 0.036 and 0.049 per decade.
34The tted regression lines are: Y Lowj;t =  0:017 + 0:014 (t = 0:33)  Sj;t + ejt and Y Highj;t = 0:027 +
0:170 (t = 5:23)  Sj;t + ejt (in the upper panel); and are:Y Lowj;t =  0:025 + 0:064 (t = 1:68)  Sj;t + ejt
and Y Highj;t = 0:021 + 0:131 (t = 3:79) Sj;t + ejt (in the lower panel). The observations that are trimmed
from the lower panel are Hawaii (1960-1980), and Wyoming, North Dakota, Michigan and District of Columbia
(2000-2007).
35The primary plus secondary measure is calculated as the mean years of schooling completed in grades 1
through 12, while the post-secondary measure is the mean years of schooling completed in grades higher than 12.
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again suggests that, consistent with our task-based framework, the value of human capital
investments appears to be conditional on the set of tasks in use, with greater gains for higher
levels of schooling where task complexity is higher.36
Though we o¤er these estimates as preliminary evidence on potential complementarities
between job task demands and worker skills, we have carried out a number of tests to conrm
the basic robustness of these patterns. In Table 3, we estimate the same models using 10-
year rather than 20-year long di¤erences and obtain qualitatively comparable results. We have
additionally estimated these models using two alternative measures of state income other than
the Census per-capita income measure. These are state personal income per capita from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis and state level log weekly wage and salary income, calculated from
Census and ACS microdata. Both alternative measures lead to similar results.37 The general
pattern of results is also not sensitive to whether regressions are weighted by state population
or whether each state is accorded equal weight, as in our estimates above.38
In net, we take these results to suggest that the relationship between human capital and
economic growth may be richer and also more contingent than the simple growth accounting
model suggests. These ndings are in the spirit, if not the letter, of the emphasis in Goldin
and Katzs book, as underscored by the quotation at the beginning of subsection 2.2. However,
they go beyond the simplest application of the growth accounting framework and highlight that
allowing for a richer set of interactions between education and technology (reected in the range
of tasks in use) may provide additional insights into the role of human capital in economic
growth.
5 What the Future May Hold
The nal part of Goldin and Katzs argument is about the erosion of the forces that had fueled
the rapid growth of education and underpinned the American Century. In this section, we
36Recent work by Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) emphasizes the role of school quality rather than quantity
in fostering cognitive skills that raise productivity and hence incomes. Viewed through this lens, one might
conjecture that the task complexity measure in our regressions serves as a proxy for school quality and, similarly,
the positive interaction between increased schooling and task complexity indicates that schooling raises income by
more when school quality is higher. One reason for skepticism about this interpretation, however, is that we fail
to detect any similar positive interaction between increases in schooling and per capita income in Tables 2 and 3.
Since we would expect per capita income to be a stronger proxy for worker productivity and hence educational
quality than task complexity per se, we suspect that the task complexity measure is not primarily serving as a
proxy for school quality.
37We prefer the PCI measure to the wage income measure; PCI is closely related to the outcome measure, GDP,
used in the education and growth literature. We prefer the Census PCI to the BEA PCI measure because the
construction of the Census measure is more transparent, and involves fewer imputations and (to our knowledge)
no ltration.
38Similarly, estimates are little changed by dropping Hawaii and the District of Columbia.
29
summarize their arguments on the challenges facing the United States and their policy recom-
mendations. We then discuss the implications of the task-based approach to human capital
about what the challenges are and what the future might hold.
5.1 Challenges to the U.S. Human Capital Machine
Goldin and Katz give a characteristically detailed and nuanced account of how the United States
has fallen behind in the quantity and quality of schooling, and what could be done to counteract
this trend.
Two distinct but related problems are apparent. First, whereas the United States was the
leader in high school graduation and then college graduation for much of the 20th century,
over the last 30 years it has become something of a laggard in both as compared to other
industrialized nations. Figure 12, which plots U.S. secondary school completions from 1930
through 1992, shows that American high school graduation rates peaked in the early 1960s and
have stagnated since.39 Figure 13, which plots the supply of young (0 to 9 years of potential
experience) male and female college relative to high school graduates in the U.S. labor market
between 1963 and 2008, shows that the trends in college completion are equally discouraging.
Despite the surge in college premium, which Goldin and Katz document in detail and which is
also visible in Figure 2 above, there has not been a robust supply response among recent cohorts.
The net e¤ect of these trends is that the United States is in the middle of the OECD pack both
in terms of high school and college graduation and this, from a country that surpassed almost
all others in both categories as late as the 1960s.
Second, the United States is also lagging behind in terms of school quality, particularly in
K-12. Goldin and Katz are careful to note that AP calculus students in the United States
compare favorably with the advanced mathematics students in almost any country, while the
average U.S. student lags behind the average student in most OECD countries in math and
science. This quality deciency is almost as worrying as the lack of progress in the high school
and college graduation margin.
Goldin and Katz rightly emphasize the role of the slowdown in the quantity and quality of
schooling in the surge in the U.S. earnings inequality: both the canonical model and variations
thereof along the lines of our task-based framework suggest that without this slowdown, the
college/high-school earnings gap and various other skill premia would have risen by less, and thus
inequality in the U.S. labor market may not have become as pronounced.40 They also correctly
39This gure is comparable to Figure 9.2 of Goldin and Katz but additionally includes separate series for
graduation rates by sex for the years for which these data are available (1930 through 1982).
40The major caveat here is from models with endogenous, directed technological change such as Acemoglu
(1998), which link the long-run evolution of skill bias to the supply of skills. These models show that a greater
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dismiss claims that high school and college completion rates may have reached a natural plateau
or that the return to additional human capital accumulation in the United States is low. Most
likely, American youth are failing to get a su¢ cient amount and quality of schooling despite not
because of the rewards to higher skills in the U.S. labor market.
So what can be done to reverse the U.S.s educational decline?
Goldin and Katz identify the roots of the problem as the failure of the U.S. school system to
ensure high quality education for more disadvantaged Americans. The U.S. school system is not
performing well overall, but it is failing particularly for poor, minority and immigrant children.
This is not to deny that the quality of education for many middle-class children can also be
increased substantially, but it is the most disadvantaged students who are most badly served.
The problem is not necessarily that the U.S. school system has declined in absolute quality, but
that the skill requirements of the workplace have risen, and simultaneously, the challenges that
schools face in managing the diversity and poor school preparedness of a substantial fraction of
the student population have mounted. The net result is that the average U.S. high school student
graduate has only modest preparation in core subject areas reading, writing, mathematics and
analytical reasoning and this in turn reduces U.S. college enrollment and completion rates, and
likely compromises the quality of the human capital acquired in college.
Goldin and Katz suggest three sets of policies to set U.S. education back on the right track.
The rst is to devote additional resources to programs such as Head Start that would invest in
the health and education of disadvantaged preschoolers, and improve the preparedness of these
students before they enter the K-12 schooling system. The second is to channel more resources
into K-12 schooling, for example, to reduce class size, particularly in school districts serving
disadvantaged families. The third is to make nancial aid for students seeking higher education
more broadly available, more generous, and more transparent.
They also note that one of the great virtues of the U.S. schooling system, its decentralized
and local structure, may have become a barrier to some of these changes. In recent decades,
this decentralization has arguably increased the racial and income segregation of U.S. students
while making it more di¢ cult to orchestrate national e¤orts to lift all boats. Finally, they
also rightly note that even if their proposed policies were highly e¤ective, they would do little
to limit income inequality at the top. Hence, to the extent that the social objective is to create
more equitable growth, not just to increase economic growth, Goldin and Katz suggests that a
return to more progressive taxation would also be necessary.
increase in the supply of skills would have led to an even more rapid skill bias, though whether this induced
skill-biased technological change e¤ect would be large enough to outweigh the direct equalizing e¤ect of the
increase in supplies is still an open question (see Acemoglu, 1998, and 2007, for details).
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While Goldin and Katzs proposed policies are, in our view, sound ones, their diagnosis of the
maladies facing the U.S. human capital machine may be unduly narrow, focusing almost entirely
on the educational system itself while not attending to the inputs on which this system draws
and the political infrastructure that underpins it. Indeed, there are several facts revealed by
Goldin and Katzs analysis that broadly hint that the U.S. educational system cannot be the sole
cause of the waning educational stature of the United States. One such clue is found in Figure
12 (as well as Figure 9.2 of Goldin and Katz). The stagnation of U.S. K-12 graduation rates did
not slowly take root over decades, as one would expect from an educational system in secular
decline. Rather, 75 years of improving U.S. secondary school graduation rates came to a sudden
and nearly complete halt in the mid-1960s and remained more or less xed at that plateau for
the next three decades. It seems implausible that this sudden stop in U.S. educational progress
is attributable exclusively to a discontinuous, permanent deterioration in the quality of the U.S.
secondary school system in the mid-1960s. Other factors are thus likely to be at play.
A similarly jarring picture of discontinuous change is seen in the evolution of U.S. college
completion rates one decade later. Figure 13 shows that Americas rising college completion
rate hit a ceiling in 1974, which it has failed to fully permeate in the ensuing 35 years. Equally
striking, this ceiling primarily arrested the post-secondary educational progress of U.S. males,
a pattern that Goldin and Katz do not discuss. In fact, male four-year college completion rates
have barely budged since 1974, even as female four-year college completion rates have surged.
Notably, the slight aggregate decline in the U.S. high school graduation rate since the early
1960s is driven almost exclusively by a declining male high school completion rate. The female
graduation rate has remained nearly constant throughout the past forty years (Heckman and
LaFontaine 2010).
As with the sudden stopin U.S. secondary school graduation rates a decade earlier, it seems
implausible that the U.S. higher education system became abruptly dysfunctional for males in
1974 even as its prowess at educating females improved. The fact that the agging output of
the U.S. educational machine a­ icts primarily one of its two product lines males and that
this fall-o¤ takes place virtually discontinuously across birth cohorts suggests to us that the
causal forces are broader and more pervasive than can be reasonably explained by discontinuous
changes within the U.S. educational system itself.
While we do not entirely agree with Goldin and Katzs diagnosis of why the United States
is losing the educational race, we concur that the additional human capital investments that
they propose have some potential to improve matters particularly by increasing the school
preparedness of U.S. children prior to their entering K-12. But this brings us to a second barrier
to reversing Americas educational slide which does not receive su¢ cient attention from Goldin
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and Katzs analysis: politics. As it was politics that underpinned American schooling exception-
alism, fundamental reforms and signicantly expanded investments in the U.S. education system
would only be possible if the political will is found to support it. Research by political scientists
and economists alike (e.g., summarized in Bartels, 2008) suggests that the U.S. political system
has been giving much more weight to the rich and wealthy and much less to the poor. If the
political voice of minority and low-income Americans remains limited, it is unlikely that the sort
of broad-based and far-reaching investments in the schooling of the most disadvantaged that
Goldin and Katz advocate will be undertaken.
5.2 Implications and Caveats from a Complementary View
Goldin and Katz highlight the decaying state of the U.S. education system and the challenge that
this poses to U.S. leadership in human capital and economic performance. They suggest that
bold action is necessary and could reverse the tide. As we discussed in the previous subsection,
there is much to agree with in this assessment. We now conclude with a brief discussion of how
an approach that emphasizes the multifaceted nature of human capital and how it is allocated to
di¤erent and changing set of tasks may lead to further ideas and some renements. Since much
of our discussion below follows from an as-yet-untested perspective, it is inevitably speculative,
and we will just list some of the ideas as potential directions for further thoughts rather than
conclusive implications backed up by a body of evidence.
1. Goldin and Katz stress the importance of increasing the supply and quality of human
capital as a way of ensuring more rapid and more equitable growth. This is likely to be
the right emphasis, though the framework outlined in Section 4 also underscores that it
is particularly important to distinguish the growth implications of this predicament from
its distributional consequences. In particular, if new technologies are indeed replacing
many tasks previously performed by middle skill workers and are also expanding the set
of tasks that high skill workers can perform, then the most important type of investments
for U.S. economic growth might be those at the top of the human capital distribution. In
terms of the framework presented above, a decline in the quality of schooling may reduce
the e¢ ciency units of labor supplied by low and medium skill workers, but in a world
in which there is a rapid expansion of the set of advanced tasks demanded, combined
with o¤shoring of middle and lower skill tasks, economic growth may still continue apace
as long as the supply of very highly skilled labor to the economy continues to expand.
Since as Goldin and Katz mentioned and we noted above, U.S. elite high schools and
(even more so) elite colleges remain among the best in the world, and assuming that the
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United States retains its ability to attract the best and brightest from other countries,
the country could plausibly continue to generate substantial innovation and technological
progress, and achieve relatively high rates of economic growth even in the face of ongoing
mediocrity in averageschooling.
Thus, if our only policy objective was to ensure the fueling of the U.S. engine of
economic growth, the educational state of the Union might not be as alarming as it
rst appears. But on this path, the U.S. economy may quite plausibly fail to create
high-paying, rewarding and stable jobs for a large fraction of its population. In this
view, the most alarming problem posed by the current educational system for the U.S.
economic model is not one of stagnating economic growth but rather one in which a rising
tide fails to raise all boats. As new technologies continue to replace the tasks performed
by medium and low skill labor, the gap between economic growth and equitable growth
may widen unless a larger share of U.S. workers is prepared to perform the work that is
made particularly valuable as the competencies of contemporary technologies continue to
improve.
2. These considerations suggest the need for a two-pronged approach. First, we have to ensure
that the U.S. system does not invest too little at the top, missing out on providing the best
human capital and most attractive entrepreneurial environment for the next generation
of innovators. Stated bluntly, the elitismof the U.S. educational system is a strength
that we would not sacrice, even in the service of the worthy goal of improving the system
on average. Simultaneously, the United States must strive to improve the e¢ cacy and
e¢ ciency of K-12 and pre-K education to provide the bulk of the workforce the skills
needed to prosper in a rapidly changing environment. Whether or not this is essential for
economic growth, it is indispensable for ensuring a more equitable distribution of (pre-tax)
incomes and, arguably, a well functioning democracy.
3. Relatedly, technological change and increases in incomes may create more jobs in services
and in the ecosystemrelated to new products rather than in assembly and actual pro-
duction. These may not take us back to a world in which high school graduates can have
generous benets through union jobs and high wage growth, but may still create opportu-
nities for workers who make appropriate vocational investments. As noted above, one of
the ironies of the computer era is that information technology has increased labors com-
parative advantage in traditionally low skill service tasks, such as food preparation and
personal care, relative to its value in traditional middle skill tasks such as computation, in-
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formation processing, and repetitive production activities. Improving workerscapabilities
to add value in these tasks is therefore more important than ever. While one may legiti-
mately be skeptical that education can do much to improve productivity in labor-intensive
technologically-lagging tasks, it is well worth noting that workers with post-secondary ed-
ucation appear to earn more in essentially all walks of life including mundane service
occupations than do those with a high school or lesser education (Carnesale, Rose and
Cheah, 2011). This suggests that increasing the skills and capabilities of even workers that
will perform the lower skill tasks in the economy the lis or the e¢ ciency units of labor
of low skill workers may be both benecial for the e¢ ciency of the aggregate economy
and for containing inequality.
4. One potential misreading of the implications of the task framework is that the U.S.
should give up on middle skill education because there is no future for middle skill
jobs. This inference is mistaken for two reasons. First, education is cumulative; students
cannot attain high skills (e.g., proving theorems) without rst mastering middle skills
(e.g., arithmetic). Not providing such skills to all students would mean foreclosing their
higher education options at an early age an idea that is profoundly antithetical to
the foundational virtues upon which Goldin and Katz argue Americas educational and
economic preeminence were built.
A second reason why middle skills will remain important is that while many mid-
dle skill tasks are susceptible to automation, many non-college jobs demand a mixture
of tasks from across the skill spectrum. To take one prominent example, medical para-
professional positions radiology technicians, phlebotomists, nurse technicians, etc. are
a numerically signicant and rapidly growing category of relatively well-remunerated,
middle skill occupations. While these paraprofessions do not require a college degree,
they do demand one to two years of post-secondary vocational training and mastery
of middle skillmathematics, life sciences, and analytical reasoning is indispensable for
success in this training. While important subsets of middle skill occupations are on the
wane (e.g., clerical and repetitive production positions), we do not forecast the demise
of all or even most middle skill jobs soon. The simple reason is that the many of the
tasks currently bundled into these jobs will not readily be unbundled into separate labor
and capital components with machines performing the middle skill tasks and workers
performing the residual. In numerous occupations, the coordination costs entailed by
such an extreme division of labor are likely to be formidable. Thus, there will remain an
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important stratum of non-college jobs that demand the foundational middleskills that
a high quality secondary education provides.
5. The response of technologies to other labor market trends also needs to be considered
in formulating forecasts and remedies about the problems of the U.S. education system.
Models of endogenous, directed technological change as discussed in footnotes 4 and 40
suggest that technologies will tend to become biased in favor of factors that are becoming
more abundant and/or more protable to utilize (Acemoglu, 1998, 2007). This suggests
that as U.S. workers become more educated, the direction of technological change may
adjust to demand more of those skills available in the market. The implications of this
endogenous technology response could cut both ways. If the lowest-skill workers become a
declining minority, technological change may pass them by, diminishing the likelihood that
economic growth will benet the bottom of the income distribution. However this is not the
only possibility. As pointed out above, a responsive and successfully reformed education
system would increase the skills of even the workers performing the lower skilled tasks (e.g.,
the lis). But if so, fostering technological change that complements the growing numbers
of workers with the education and capability to utilize new technologies may become an
attractive channel by which all boats may be lifted.
6. Finally, if our emphasis above that the U.S. human capital century was underpinned by
politics is correct, then it becomes particularly important to consider how the United
States will form the political coalitions needed to support a renewed focus on investing in
the quality of education, both at the top and the bottom of the distribution.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.612 -0.339 -0.644 -0.562 -0.556
(0.128) (0.043) (0.066) (0.112) (0.094)
Time 0.027 0.016 0.028 0.029 0.020
(0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
-0.010
(0.002)
Time2/100 -0.013 0.036
(0.006) (0.012)
Time3/1000 -0.007
(0.002)
Constant -0.217 0.059 -0.254 -0.189 -0.145
(0.134) (0.039) (0.066) (0.122) (0.103)
Observations 25 46 46 46 46
R-squared 0.558 0.935 0.961 0.941 0.960
Δ CLG/HS 
Relative Supply
Time X post-1992
Table 1. Regression Models for the Change in the College/High-
School Log Wage Gap, 1963-2008
1963-2008
Source: March CPS data for earnings years 1963-2008.
1963-
1987
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log PI-1 -0.401 -0.415 -0.401 -0.435 -0.343 -0.312 -0.312 -0.330
(0.059) (0.057) (0.059) (0.056) (0.058) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057)
School (yrs)-1 -0.011 -0.022 -0.012 0.003 0.125 0.117 0.135 0.126
(0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.045) (0.042) (0.045) (0.043)
Task Complexity-1 1.391 1.295 1.391 1.231 0.826 0.480 0.610 0.503
(0.261) (0.254) (0.262) (0.249) (0.286) (0.272) (0.285) (0.274)
Δ School (yrs) 0.097 0.072 0.097 0.084
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031)
1.427 2.462
(0.423) (0.549)
Δ School × log PI-1 0.014 -0.458
(0.128) (0.160)
0.354 0.311 0.346 0.315
(0.070) (0.065) (0.068) (0.066)
Δ Post-Secondary School -0.040 -0.090 -0.076 -0.079
(0.046) (0.043) (0.047) (0.044)
-0.460 0.441
(0.688) (1.163)
3.028 3.107
(0.573) (0.827)
-0.099 -0.216
(0.130) (0.205)
0.625 -0.158
(0.210) (0.275)
R2 0.38 0.42 0.38 0.45 0.44 0.53 0.48 0.54
n=153 pooled changes. Standard errors in parentheses. Unweighted OLS regressions. Dependent variable is stacked 
changes in state per-capita income (PCI) between 1960-1980, 1980-2000, and 2000-2007 (normalized for period 
length). State PCI is from Census Bureau Income Surveys reports for 1960 through 2000 and American Community 
Survey data for years 2006-2008. All righthand side variables are calculated from Census IPUMS and American 
Community Survey data sources following the procedures in Acemoglu and Autor (2010). Task Complexity measure 
equals the start-of-period fraction of state employment in professional, managerial and technical occupations. Models 
also include an intercept and time period dummies.
Δ Post-Secondary School × 
Log PI-1
Table 2. Pooled 20-Year Changes in Log Per Capita Income, with Detailed Education Categories and 
Interactions with Initial Income or Fraction of Skilled Jobs
Δ School × Task Complexity-1
Δ Primary+Secondary School
Δ Primary+Secondary School 
× Task Complexity-1
Δ Post-Secondary School × 
Task Complexity-1
Δ Primary+Secondary School 
× Log PI-1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log PI-1 -0.215 -0.223 -0.216 -0.235 -0.199 -0.193 -0.195 -0.207
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
School (yrs)-1 -0.028 -0.030 -0.023 -0.017 0.002 0.011 0.009 0.019
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Task Complexity-1 0.790 0.775 0.792 0.766 0.667 0.525 0.621 0.555
(0.151) (0.150) (0.151) (0.149) (0.162) (0.167) (0.166) (0.168)
Δ School (yrs) 0.065 0.057 0.072 0.073
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
0.867 1.664
(0.477) (0.570)
Δ School × log PI-1 -0.129 -0.374
(0.126) (0.150)
0.164 0.169 0.162 0.176
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Δ Post-Secondary School -0.004 -0.040 -0.007 -0.021
(0.044) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047)
-0.124 1.131
(0.722) (1.048)
2.268 2.206
(0.733) (0.881)
-0.219 -0.365
(0.148) (0.212)
0.197 -0.148
(0.219) (0.252)
R2 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.32
n=255 pooled changes. Standard errors in parentheses. Unweighted OLS regressions. Dependent variable is stacked 
decadal changes in state per-capita income (PCI) between 1960 through 2007 (normalized for period length). State 
PCI is from Census Bureau Income Surveys reports for 1960 through 2000 and American Community Survey data for 
years 2006-2008. All right-hand side variables are calculated from Census IPUMS and American Community Survey 
data sources following the procedures in Acemoglu and Autor (2010). Task Complexity measure equals the start-of-
period fraction of state employment in professional, managerial and technical occupations. Models also include an 
intercept and time period dummies.        
        
Δ Post-Secondary School × 
Log PI-1
Table 3. Pooled 10-Year Changes in Log Per Capita Income, with Detailed Education Categories and 
Interactions with Initial Income or Fraction of Skilled Jobs
Δ School × Task Complexity-1
Δ Primary+Secondary School
Δ Primary+Secondary School 
× Task Complexity-1
Δ Post-Secondary School × 
Task Complexity-1
Δ Primary+Secondary School 
× Log PI-1
Figure	  1	  
	  
Source:	   March	   CPS	   data	   for	   earnings	   years	   1963-­‐2008.	   Labor	   supply	   is	   calculated	   using	   all	   persons	   ages	   16-­‐64	   who	  
reported	  having	  worked	  at	  least	  one	  week	  in	  the	  earnings	  years,	  excluding	  those	  in	  the	  military.	  The	  data	  are	  sorted	  into	  
sex-­‐education-­‐experience	  groups	  of	   two	  sexes	   (male/female),	   five	  education	  groups	   (high	  school	  dropout,	  high	  school	  
graduate,	  some	  college,	  college	  graduate,	  and	  greater	  than	  college)	  and	  49	  experience	  groups	  (0-­‐48	  years	  of	  potential	  
experience).	  Number	  of	  years	  of	  potential	  experience	  is	  calculated	  by	  subtracting	  the	  six	  (the	  age	  at	  which	  one	  begins	  
school)	  and	  the	  number	  of	  years	  of	  schooling	  from	  the	  age	  of	  the	  individual.	  This	  number	  is	  adjusted	  to	  the	  assumption	  
that	  an	  individual	  cannot	  begin	  work	  before	  age	  16.	  If	  this	  calculation	  is	  less	  than	  zero,	  the	  years	  of	  experience	  are	  set	  to	  
equal	   zero.	   The	   labor	   supply	   for	   college/high-­‐school	   groups,	   by	   experience	   level,	   is	   calculated	   using	   efficiency	   units.	  
Efficiency	  units	  are	  the	  mean	  labor	  supply	  for	  broad	  college	  (including	  college	  graduates	  and	  greater	  than	  college)	  and	  
high-­‐school	   (including	   high	   school	   dropouts	   and	   high	   school	   graduate)	   categories,	  weighted	   by	   fixed	   relative	   average	  
wage	  weights	  for	  each	  cell.	  The	  labor	  supply	  of	  the	  “some	  college”	  category	  is	  divided	  equally	  between	  the	  broad	  college	  
and	  high-­‐school	  categories.	  The	  fixed	  set	  of	  weights	  for	  1963-­‐2008	  are	  constructed	  using	  the	  average	  wage	   in	  each	  of	  
the	  490	  cells	  (2	  sexes,	  5	  education	  groups,	  49	  experience	  groups)	  over	  this	  time	  period,	  relative	  to	  the	  reference	  wage	  of	  
a	  male	  high	  school	  graduate	  with	  10	  years	  of	  experience.	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Figure	  2	  
	  
Source:	  March	  CPS	  data	  for	  earnings	  years	  1963-­‐2008.	  Log	  weekly	  wages	  for	  full-­‐time,	  full-­‐year	  workers	  are	  regressed	  in	  
each	   year	   on	   four	   education	   dummies	   (high	   school	   dropout,	   some	   college,	   college	   graduate,	   greater	   than	   college),	   a	  
quartic	   in	  experience,	   interactions	  of	   the	  education	  dummies	  and	  experience	  quartic,	   and	   two	   race	   categories	   (black,	  
non-­‐white	   other).	   The	   composition-­‐adjusted	   mean	   log	   wage	   is	   the	   predicted	   log	   wage	   evaluated	   for	   whites	   at	   the	  
relevant	   experience	   level	   (5,	   15,	   25,	   35,	   45	   years)	   and	   relevant	   education	   level	   (high	   school	   dropout,	   high	   school	  
graduate,	  some	  college,	  college	  graduate,	  greater	  than	  college).	  The	  mean	   log	  wage	  for	  college	  and	  high	  school	   is	   the	  
weighted	   average	   of	   the	   relevant	   composition	   adjusted	   cells	   using	   a	   fixed	   set	   of	   weights	   equal	   to	   the	   average	  
employment	  share	  of	  each	  group.	  The	  ratio	  of	  mean	   log	  wages	   for	  college	  and	  high	  school	  graduates	   for	  each	  year	   is	  
plotted.	  See	  Data	  Appendix	  for	  more	  details	  on	  treatment	  of	  March	  CPS	  data.	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Figure	  3	  
	  
Source:	  March	  CPS	  data	  for	  earnings	  years	  1963-­‐2008.	  Log	  weekly	  wages	  for	  full-­‐time,	  full-­‐year	  workers	  are	  regressed	  in	  
each	   year	   on	   four	   education	   dummies	   (high	   school	   dropout,	   some	   college,	   college	   graduate,	   greater	   than	   college),	   a	  
quartic	   in	  experience,	   interactions	  of	   the	  education	  dummies	  and	  experience	  quartic,	   and	   two	   race	   categories	   (black,	  
non-­‐white	   other).	   The	   composition-­‐adjusted	   mean	   log	   wage	   is	   the	   predicted	   log	   wage	   evaluated	   for	   whites	   at	   the	  
relevant	   experience	   level	   (5,	   15,	   25,	   35,	   45	   years)	   and	   relevant	   education	   level	   (high	   school	   dropout,	   high	   school	  
graduate,	  some	  college,	  college	  graduate,	  greater	  than	  college).	  The	  mean	   log	  wage	  for	  college	  and	  high	  school	   is	   the	  
weighted	   average	   of	   the	   relevant	   composition	   adjusted	   cells	   using	   a	   fixed	   set	   of	   weights	   equal	   to	   the	   average	  
employment	  share	  of	  each	  group.	  The	  ratio	  of	  mean	   log	  wages	   for	  college	  and	  high	  school	  graduates	   for	  each	  year	   is	  
plotted.	  See	  Data	  Appendix	  for	  more	  details	  on	  treatment	  of	  March	  CPS	  data.	  The	  Katz-­‐Murphy	  predicted	  wage	  gap	  are	  
the	  predicted	  values	  from	  a	  regression	  of	  the	  college/high-­‐school	  wage	  gap	  on	  time	  trend	  term	  and	  log	  labor	  supply,	  as	  
measured	  in	  efficiency	  units	  described	  in	  the	  note	  to	  Figure	  2,	  for	  years	  1963-­‐1987.	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  Figure	  4	  
	  
Source:	  March	  CPS	  data	  for	  earnings	  years	  1963-­‐2008.	  See	  note	  to	  Figure	  21.	  The	  detrended	  supply	  and	  wage	  series	  are	  
the	  residuals	  from	  separate	  OLS	  regressions	  of	  the	  relative	  supply	  and	  relative	  wage	  measures	  on	  a	  constant	  and	  a	  linear	  
time	  trend.	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Figure	  5a:	  Trends	  in	  Full-­‐Time,	  Full-­‐Year	  Weekly	  Wages	  
	  
Figure	  5b:	  Trends	  in	  Hourly	  Wages	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Figure	  6	  
	  
Source:	  March	  CPS	  data	  for	  earnings	  years	  1963-­‐2008.	  See	  note	  to	  Figure	  1.	  The	  real	  log	  weekly	  wage	  for	  each	  education	  
group	   is	   the	   weighted	   average	   of	   the	   relevant	   composition	   adjusted	   cells	   using	   a	   fixed	   set	   of	   weights	   equal	   to	   the	  
average	  employment	  share	  of	  each	  group.	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Figure	  7	  
	  
Source:	  May/ORG	  CPS	  data	  for	  earnings	  years	  1973-­‐2009.	  The	  data	  are	  pooled	  using	  three-­‐year	  moving	  averages	  (i.e.	  the	  
year	  1974	  includes	  data	  from	  years	  1973,	  1974	  and	  1975).	  For	  each	  denoted	  time	  period,	  the	  change	  in	  the	  5th-­‐95th	  
percentile	  of	  log	  weekly	  wages	  is	  calculated.	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Figure	  8	  
	  
	  
Source:	  Census	  IPUMS	  5	  percent	  samples	  for	  years	  1980,	  1990,	  and	  2000,	  and	  Census	  American	  Community	  Survey	  for	  
2008.	   All	   occupation	   and	   earnings	  measures	   in	   these	   samples	   refer	   to	   prior	   year’s	   employment.	   The	   figure	   plots	   log	  
changes	  in	  employment	  shares	  by	  1980	  occupational	  skill	  percentile	  rank	  using	  a	  locally	  weighted	  smoothing	  regression	  
(bandwidth	  0.8	  with	  100	  observations),	  where	   skill	   percentiles	   are	  measured	  as	   the	  employment-­‐weighted	  percentile	  
rank	  of	  an	  occupation’s	  mean	  log	  wage	  in	  the	  Census	  IPUMS	  1980	  5	  percent	  extract.	  Mean	  education	  in	  each	  occupation	  
is	   calculated	   using	  workers’	   hours	   of	   annual	   labor	   supply	   times	   the	   Census	   sampling	  weights.	   Consistent	   occupation	  
codes	  for	  Census	  years	  1980,	  1990,	  and	  2000,	  and	  2008	  are	  from	  Autor	  and	  Dorn	  (2009a).	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Figure	  9	  
	  
Source:	  May/ORG	  CPS	  files	  for	  earnings	  years	  1979-­‐2010.	  The	  data	  include	  all	  persons	  ages	  16-­‐64	  who	  reported	  having	  
worked	   last	   year,	   excluding	   those	   employed	   by	   the	   military	   and	   in	   agricultural	   occupations.	   Occupations	   are	   first	  
converted	   from	   their	   respective	   scheme	   into	   326	   occupation	   groups	   consistent	   over	   the	   given	   time	   period.	   All	   non-­‐
military,	  non-­‐agriculture	  occupations	  are	  assigned	  to	  one	  of	  ten	  broad	  occupations	  presented	  in	  the	  figure.	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Figure	  10	  
	  
Source:	  Data	  on	  EU	  employment	  are	  from	  from	  Goos,	  Manning	  and	  Salomons,	  2009a.	  US	  data	  are	  from	  the	  May/ORG	  
CPS	  files	  for	  earnings	  years	  1993-­‐2006.	  The	  data	  include	  all	  persons	  ages	  16-­‐64	  who	  reported	  having	  worked	  last	  year,	  
excluding	   those	   employed	   by	   the	  military	   and	   in	   agricultural	   occupations.	  Occupations	   are	   first	   converted	   from	   their	  
respective	   scheme	   into	   326	   occupation	   groups	   consistent	   over	   the	   given	   time	   period.	   These	   occupations	   are	   then	  
grouped	  into	  three	  broad	  categories	  by	  wage	  level.	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Figure	  11.	  Pooled	  20-­‐Year	  Relative	  State	  Level	  Changes	  in	  Log	  Per	  Capita	  Income	  
and	  Average	  Years	  of	  Schooling,	  1960	  –	  2007	  	  
	  
A.	  All	  States	  
	  
	  
B.	  Outliers	  Trimmed	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Figure	  12.	  U.S.	  High	  School	  Graduation	  Rate	  Overall	  	  
and	  by	  Sex,	  1930-­‐1991	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Figure	  13	  
	  
Source:	  March	  CPS	  data	  for	  earnings	  years	  1963-­‐2008.	  See	  note	  to	  Figure	  1.	  Log	  relative	  supply	  for	  0-­‐9	  and	  20-­‐29	  years	  
of	  potential	  experience	  is	  plotted	  for	  males	  and	  females.	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